Automated Analysis of Non-interference Security by Refinement

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Secure Refinement-oriented Approach A short history (1/2)

• Traditional refinement reduces non-determinism, preserving all "relevant properties".

 $P \sqcap Q \sqsubseteq P$

- Traditional formal approaches to security model a "secret" as a non-deterministic choice over its "type".
- Refinement paradox:

$h :\in \{0, 1\}$		h := 0
$h :\in \{0, 1\}$	⊈secure	h := 0

- Traditional refinement is defined relative to a flat state space.
- Secure refinement uses a structured state space.

Secure Refinement

- Specialisation of classical refinement;
- Preserves non-interference security properties;
- It is compositional;
- It supports hierarchical program development;
- Its semantics provides a link between "source code" and the "mathematics underlying secrecy".
- Morgan. *The Shadow Knows: Refinement of Ignorance in Sequential Programs.* In Math. Prog. Construction, Springer 2006.



Secure Refinement-oriented Approach A short history (2/2)

- A secret is an undisclosed choice over a set of possibilities.
- A non-deterministic choice is a disclosed choice, with the selection made as a program is developed.
- The two choices should be distinguished in the semantics.
 - Undisclosed choice cannot (accidentally) be "refined away",

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so that refinements preserve secrecy.





Refinement with Viewpoints

- Equality between programs: There are no differences between programs, from any agent's viewpoint.
- A secret maintained by program P is also kept by Q if P = Q.

The Attack Model

- During program execution, after each "atomic step":
 - can "look" at the visible variables
 - cannot "look" at the hidden variables
- ② Can observe any branching.
- (1) and (2) imply compositionality of refinement.
- A qualitative approach: "run the program only once".

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Hidden/Visibles in the Programming Language

- v (of type V) is visible, h (of type H) is hidden.
- *H* (of type $\mathbb{P}(\mathcal{H})$) the shadow the set of possible values of *h*.
- Program: $\llbracket P \rrbracket \in \mathcal{V} \times \mathcal{H} \times \mathbb{P}(\mathcal{H}) \to \mathbb{P}(\mathcal{V} \times \mathcal{H} \times \mathbb{P}(\mathcal{H}))$
- Assume: $v, h \in \{0, 1\}$, initially *H* is $\{0, 1\}$.

	Program P	[[<i>P</i>]] (<i>v</i> , <i>h</i> , <i>H</i>)
Set hidden	<i>h</i> := 0	$\{(v, 0, \{0\})\}$
	$h:\in\{0,1\}$	$\{(v,0,\{0,1\}),(v,1,\{0,1\})\}$
Set visible	<i>v</i> := 0	$\{(0, h, \{0, 1\})\}$
	$v:\in\{0,1\}$	$\{(0,h,\{0,1\}),(1,h,\{0,1\})\}$
Swap hidden	$h:\in\{0,1\};h:=1-h$	$\{(v,0,\{0,1\}),(v,1,\{0,1\})\}$
Swap hidden	$h:\in\{0,1\}; h:=1-h$	$\{(v, 0, \{0, 1\}), (v, 1, \{0, 1\})\}$



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Secure Refinement Preserves Secrecy

• Refinement: $P_1 \sqsubseteq P_2$, if for all v, h, H, we have

 $\begin{array}{l} \forall (v',h',H_2') \in \llbracket P_2 \rrbracket (v,h,H) \Rightarrow \\ (\exists H_1' \subseteq H_2' \cdot (v',h',H_1') \in \llbracket P_1 \rrbracket (v,h,H)) \end{array}$

• Undisclosed choice cannot be refined away:

 $h:\in\{0,1\} \not\sqsubseteq h:=0$

• *Disclosed* choice can be refined away

 $\textit{\textit{v}}:\in\{0,1\}\ \sqsubseteq\ \textit{\textit{v}}:=0$

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Secure Development


In secure refinement-oriented framework:

- we do not say that "a program is secure",
- we write a specification which "obviously" captures our requirements (both functional and security),
- specification summarises the intentions of the designer: inefficient or unimplementable "programs".
- we use refinement to add detail.
- Result: avoid building insecurities into the system.

Modelling Encryption

- Encryption is the most fundamental secure program.
- Publishing the exclusive-or of a "randomly" chosen, hidden bit, reveals nothing about the secret *E*.

vis *v*; **hid** $h \cdot h :\in \{0, 1\}$; $v := E \oplus h$



• Encryption is secure: having the same semantics as SKIP (*v*, *h* are "local variables").


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Refinement with Viewpoints

- vis means the associated variable is visible to all agents.
- hid means the associated variable is hidden from all agents.
- **vis**_{list} means the associated variable is visible to all agents in the (non-empty) list, and is hidden from all others (including third parties).
- **hid**_{*list*} means the associated variable is hidden from all agents in the list, and is visible to all others (including third parties).





Encryption with Viewpoints


 $vis_A a; vis_B b; (a \oplus b) := E$

where

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- $(a \oplus b) := E$: a, b become such that to $a' \oplus b' = E$,
- it is the (atomic) choice over all possibilities of splitting E

The full formal proof of the encryption lemma looks like this



Possible Improvement

- Can we automate these proofs?
 - Event-B/Rodin Platform
- Can we strengthen the attack model to something which is closer to the assumptions used in the creation of cryptographic primitives?
 - McIver, Meinicke, Morgan. Compositional Closure for Bayes Risk in Probabilistic Interference. ICALP 2010.



Can We Automate These Proofs? (1/4)

- Event-B: modelling discrete transition systems using refinement.
- Event-B is supported by the Rodin Platform.
- A specialised refinement is implemented for the Rodin platform.
- An extra variable H (the "Shadow") is generated to keep track of the possible values of hidden variables h.
- Extra refinement relations for shadow refinement.
- Rodin generates and discharges many of the obligations related to shadow refinement.
- Interactively prove the remaining obligations within Rodin.

Can We Automate These Proofs? (2/4)

- Difficulty: it was awkward to generate and supply the invariants for the shadow H.
- Solution: Implemented a "front-end" for inputting program directly, using Rodin as a "back-end" for verification.

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The shadow invariants are generated in Rodin.



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
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Can We Automate These Proofs? (3/4)

HIDE:X variables: E, fresult, H1 result: skip; [= result when VIS v : X fresult = FHID h : X then fresult := T $FUN \oplus : X \times X \rightarrow X$ end result: $v = h \oplus E$ invariants: $E \in H1$ *fresult* = $F \Rightarrow H1 = X$ *fresult* = $T \Rightarrow (\forall vb \cdot vb \in H1 \Rightarrow vb \in X)$ MACQUARIE ETH McIver, Meinicke, Sloane, Susatvo Non-interference Security by Refinemen CryptoForma, 21/06/1

Can We Automate These Proofs? (4/4)



Strengthen the Attack Model? (1/2)

- McIver, Meinicke, Morgan. Compositional Closure for Bayes Risk in Probabilistic Interference, ICALP 2010.
- A generalisation of the Shadow Know to deal with probability.
- v (of type V) is visible, h (of type H) is hidden.
- δ (of type $\mathcal{D}(\mathcal{H})$) a distribution of *h*.
- Non-deterministic choices, e.g., h :∈ E(v, h), are interpreted as uniform choice over the value of E(v, h).

Strengthen the Attack Model? (1/2)

We specialise that work

- to determine when Rodin certified proofs maybe lifted to the more general probabilistic model,
- to identify a subset of language constructs which preserve uniform choices in all contexts.

Sketch ideas:

- Restrict our programs to those preserving total uniformity of hidden distribution.
- Assuming uniformity of the initial hidden distribution, we can reason about distributions the same way as sets.



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Conclusions and Future Work

- We shown how to automate Shadow refinement proofs using Event-B/Rodin.
- The proofs are valid for a restricted sub-sets of language of probabilistic model.
- Future work:
 - Better integration tool support.
 - Applications to other protocols.

