

‘Empire on the Eastern Sea’: the Influence of Asian and Western Imperialism on National Identity Formation in Japan and China

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The last few years of the twentieth century saw China and Japan faced by events that revealed something of the importance of imperialism upon their national identities. One was publicised widely within the world press, the other barely received column space. The former was the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997, the latter was the decision of the Japanese *Diet* in August 1999 to officially reinstall the national anthem and flag as the emblems of Japan.¹

Hong Kong’s return was, for many Chinese, presented as the final battle between the Chinese nation and foreign imperialism. The anti-imperialist rhetoric of Sun Yat-sen, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping was read publicly and proudly. Themed entertainment based on the history of China since the First Opium War (1839-42) was presented for the masses.² Contrastingly, two years later the flag (*hinomaru* or *nisshōki*) and national anthem (*kimigayo*) that had symbolised Imperial Japan were reinstated as Japan’s official national symbols after a moratorium brought about to come to terms with their controversial imperial past.³ These examples remind us that imperialism remains an important factor in the maintenance of national identity in these two countries.⁴ However, it also hints at the reality that imperialism’s role in the formation of these identities is not simply a matter of *Western* imperialism but also of an ‘indigenous’ *Asian* imperialism.

This study considers the importance of Western and Asian imperialism in the formation of Japanese and Chinese identities. It will be looking at two phases of imperialism in Asia during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: firstly, the arrival of Western imperialism, secondly, the emergence of the new Asian imperialism.

East meets West: Memetics and Metamorphoses

Western imperialism’s arrival in Asia was a pivotal moment for Japanese and Chinese national identities. However, superficially it suggests that its main influence was to *undermine* rather than *construct* such identities.

By the late 1800s Japan was in the throes of an unprecedented metamorphosis. Japanese society had adopted significant proportions of Western culture to such an extent that by the

mid-1890s a Chinese commentator ‘felt that Western culture had been imported to Japan in almost its original shape’.⁵ From 1872 Japanese officials had been prescribed to wear Western dress and by the late 1870s it was considered *de rigueur* for your outward appearance to mirror the European style.⁶

This process was deepened by the early 1900s with seemingly no part of Japanese daily life unaffected by Western culture. Education was universal by 1910 and based largely along Western lines.⁷ Government encouraged the Westernisation of house interiors through the Alliance of Lifestyle Improvement founded in 1920.⁸ Furthermore, as we will consider later, their empire resembled their European cousins.⁹ Some Japanese modernisers saw this change as being in keeping with Japanese identity by making it part of their collective historical traditions. Thus Nitobe Inazō in 1884 argued that because their ancestors had sought knowledge from Korea and China the modern Japanese should ‘emulate [their ancestors] and must absorb knowledge from the West.’¹⁰ Nonetheless, the contrast between late-Tokugawa and late-Meiji Japan revealed the transformative impact of Western imperialism upon Japanese identity.

Similarly, in China the arrival of Western imperialism served, at least for some, to undermine the *traditional* identity of the nation. The Treaty Ports began to compromise the traditional understanding of China as the ‘Middle Kingdom’ (*zhong guo*/中国). In other words, it undermined the nature of China as the centre of the moral universe.¹¹ The Western powers had gained important concessions in these ports since the Unequal Treaties signed after the Opium Wars (1839-42 and 1856-60). The economic privilege held meant the cities revolved economically, politically and culturally around the West. Consequently, a distinctly Western culture dominated the Treaty Ports. For instance, Shanghai soon began to adopt the styles and ways of the world outside of China. Visitors

1. Christopher P. Hood, *Japanese Education Reform: Nakasone’s Legacy* (London: Routledge, 2005), 166.

2. Henrietta Harrison, *China* (London: Hodder Arnold, 2001), 265.

3. John Nathan, *Japan Unbound* (New York: Houghton & Mifflin, 2004), 159-60.

4. It is important to note that a distinction between ‘national identity’ and ‘nationalism’ has regularly been developed in some analyses and yet, in others, the two terms have become interchangeable. With regard to China and Japan, due to the fact they were never formally colonised, the distinction between cultural identity (national identity) and political identity (nationalism) is not clear-cut and thus in this study the two terms are largely dealt with as one body. Lynn Williams, ‘National Identity and the Nation State: construction, reconstruction and contradiction’ in *National Identity*, ed. Keith Cameron (Exeter: Intellect, 1999), 15.

5. Chuzo Ichiko, ‘Political and Institutional Reform 1901-11,’ in *Cambridge History of China: late Ch’ing, 1800-1911*, vol. 11, ed. John King Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 377.

6. Donald H. Shively, ‘The Japanization of the Middle Meiji,’ in *Tradition and Modernization in Japanese Culture*, ed. Donald H. Shively (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), 82.

7. Ann Waswo, *Modern Japanese Society, 1868-1994* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 29.

8. Indeed, since 1909 the company *Amerikaya* helped encourage the adoption of Western (in particular American) housing styles: Kashiwagi Hiroshi, ‘On Rationalization and the National Lifestyle,’ in *Being Modern in Japan*, ed. Elise K. Tipton and John Clark (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2000), 62-63.

9. Mark R. Peattie, ‘The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945,’ in *The Cambridge History of Japan: the twentieth century*, vol. 6, ed. Peter Duus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 233.

10. Cited in John Lie, *Multiethnic Japan* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2004), 36. A particularly cogent discussion by Lie on this issue can be found at Lie, ‘The Discourse of Japaneseness,’ in *Japan and Global Migration*, ed. Mike Douglass and Glenda S. Roberts (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai’i Press, 2003), 70-90

11. Harrison, *China*, 55.

noted, amongst other things, the paved streets, Western-style buildings and street lighting—all out of the ordinary for China.¹²

These Treaty Ports undermined the idea of China as the 'Middle Kingdom.' Indicatively, the future reformist Liang Qichao—arriving in Shanghai in 1890—suddenly became aware that nations beyond the dynastic boundaries had their own identities highly distinct from the Chinese.¹³ China was no longer the 'Middle Kingdom.' For some these cities were the stimuli for the 'contraction of China from a world to a nation in the world' which changed the 'Chinese historical consciousness'.¹⁴ The newly emerging national identity in these cities—created by the arrival and use of Western styles and intellectual concepts—also created a split in the emerging national identity of China: those of the modern, urban, 'Western' identity and those of the traditional, rural, 'Middle Kingdom' identity. Accordingly, Western imperialism struck at the heart of Chinese national identity by breaking the fundamental *collective or communal* nature of such an identity.

Nonetheless, Western imperialism also provided material for the *construction* of national identity. Firstly, national identity emerges 'where and when a particular ethnicity or nation feels itself threatened in regard to its own proper character, extent or importance.'¹⁵ Thus the success of Western culture—brought about by imperialism—in *undermining* Chinese and Japanese identities, paradoxically, was also the impetus for the *creation* of national identity. Furthermore, the arrival of Western imperial powers brought with it the concepts that shaped such an identity. Symbolically, it provided heroes and martyrs such as Lin Zexu and also items such as flags and national anthems. The West brought the intellectual ideas that would guide the nation's development such as republicanism, constitutionalism, democracy and even nationalism.¹⁶ Indeed, it even brought a new concept of 'imperialism' to Asia.

Re-defining Japanese Identity: New Asian Imperialism and Regional and Global Identity

The role of this change in imperialism in the development of national identity is important in the next phase of imperialism: the emergence of new Asian imperialism, particularly the emergence of Imperial Japan.

Certainly, Japan had always been 'Imperial Japan' and hence it already represented an important part of their identity.¹⁷ Nonetheless, with the arrival of the Western imperial powers this importance was enhanced. Modernisation—required due to the arrival and based upon the blueprint of the Western powers—had brought about a concomitant change in the

definition of 'civilisation' and 'barbarism.' Modernised Japan now considered itself *the* civilised Asian nation and thus worthy of such treatment. Hence the Treaty of Kanghwa with Korea in 1876 mirrored the Unequal Treaties foisted upon Japan and China in the mid-1800s including the issue of extraterritoriality.¹⁸ Japan believed that, 'until Korea modernised...it was not worthy of an equal treaty'.¹⁹

The coming of age of Japan's imperial ambitions marked a tipping point for Japanese and Chinese national identities. Japan's emphatic victory in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-5) marked the beginning of Japan's transformation as a nation. Firstly, it marked the beginning of the new modern national identity. Secondly, it revealed the workings of the modern nation-state so integral to forging a collective national identity. Thirdly, it marked Japan's entry into the international order.

Japan's traditional 'national' identity was founded upon an 'age-old cultural respect for China.'²⁰ Its morals, language and social status system were built upon Chinese protocol and had found ways of adapting them into Japanese culture.²¹ However, the First Sino-Japanese War was a watershed for the creation of the new national identity. Japan's victory marked her as the new vector of 'civilisation'—replacing China—in Asia. Her modernisation marked her as the new 'civilisation' and China the new 'barbarian.' Popular songs described China as the 'enemy of civilisation' and Japan as engaging in a 'righteous war' against her.²² The government increasingly popularised the idea that Japan was the new centre of the regional world.²³ This overt kidnapping of the central plank of the Chinese world order (as the 'Middle Kingdom') remains an integral part of Japanese national identity today even if it is in opposition to the original claim. The First Sino-Japanese War also revealed elements of the workings behind the modern state as the press began to play an integral role in publicising the war and the reasons and intentions behind it.²⁴ At the end of the war in 1895, one editorial declared, 'will be remembered as the year of international recognition,' another talked of the West calling 'us as we call ourselves: Nippon, which has a meaning, the rising sun, and there will be no more "Japan" or "Japs" in the foreign press'.²⁵ Japan's new identity was its new empire and the symbolism was loudly broadcasted. Emperor Meiji's time with troops was widely documented in the press and the flag and newly instituted national anthem were gaining importance as national symbols.²⁶

12. Harrison, *China*, 177.

13. Xiaobing Tang, *Global Space and the Nationalist Discourse of Modernity* (Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press, 1996), 1.

14. Joseph Levenson, 'The Genesis of Confucian China and its Modern Fate,' in *The Historian's Workshop: original essays by sixteen historians*, ed. L.P. Curtis, Jr (New York: Knopf, 1970), 288.

15. Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 4.

16. Lin Zexu's vociferous moral objection to the Opium trade ultimately contributed to the outbreak of the First Opium War. As a result of China's defeat, he was made a scapegoat and exiled by the Qing Dynasty. He is now held as a national hero in China and even has a statue in New York's Chinatown.

17. Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire* (London: University of California Press, 1999), 89.

18. Mark Ravina, 'State-Making in Global Context: Japan in a World of Nation-States,' in *The Teleology of the Modern Nation-State: Japan and China*, ed. Joshua A. Fogel (Philadelphia, PA.: University of Pennsylvania, 2005), 87.

19. Christopher Goto-Jones, *Modern Japan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 64.

20. Carol Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths* (Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1985), 136.

21. Joy Hendry, *Understanding Japanese Society* (London: Routledge, 1987), 18; Shively, 'The Japanization of the Middle Meiji,' 78.

22. Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths*, 136.

23. Goto-Jones, *Modern Japan*, 66

24. The role of the national press is widely considered a core vector of national identity. Anyone familiar with Benedict Anderson's seminal *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 2006) will be aware of its significant role in creating a common memory and understanding of events of importance at which not everybody in the country was present. Indeed, implicit recognition of this importance of the press was highlighted during the ill-fated 1898 Hundred Days Reform in China. W. Scott Morton and Charlton M. Lewis, *China: Its History and Culture* (London: McGraw Hill, 2004), 171.

25. Cited in Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths*, 89.

26. Nathan, *Japan Unbound*, 159.

Theft and Humiliation: China's Stolen Identity in a Global World

The desire for recognition amongst the Western nations was also an important part of both Japanese and Chinese national identity. For example, Japan's achievement in reversing the *Ansei* (Unequal) Treaties in 1899 and in receiving recognition by alliances with both Britain (1902) and France (1907) meant that their confidence as a nation soared and national identity began to adopt a more indigenous national character with the rise of 'Japanism'.²⁷

Contrastingly, China continues to pursue international recognition, something that was a common claim on the success of the 2008 Beijing Olympic bid.²⁸ Subsequently, Chinese national identity continues to be formed around a basic tenet of both Western and Japanese imperialism: the issue of perceived cultural superiority.²⁹ Many nations continue to presume the backwardness of China in all fields including politics, economics and even—as a 2010 *New Scientist* article highlighted—science.³⁰ This is the impact of *external* identity (i.e. how other communities imagine their identity) upon the conception of *internal* identity (i.e. identity as understood by those of the community). Imperialism—with its prejudices and biases based upon the concept of cultural superiority—allowed national identity to form in this realm.³¹

For China, the emergence of this new Asian imperialism was also important for her national identity. Liang Qichao may have discovered the reality that a new world order brought about by imperialism was in existence in Shanghai but the arrival of new Asian imperialism brought this realisation to a wider audience. China was no longer the 'Middle Kingdom' of the world. Indeed, Japan had proven during the Sino-Japanese Wars that she was not even the 'Middle Kingdom' of Asia.

It is possible that this stimulus to action was even more profound when the influence of *historical* Asian imperialism is considered. Japan had never been considered of any historical significance to China.³² Indeed, Japan was often known as the 'dwarf kingdom' (*Wō guo*/倭国).³³ Their defeat by Japan in 1895 was therefore a 'political and cultural earthquake' and thus considered even greater a humiliation to China as a nation.³⁴ The sense of humiliation—whether real or not—has remained a critical part of Chinese national

identity. This can be seen most notably in the almost platitudinous Chinese phrase *bǎinián guóchǐ* ('hundred years of humiliation'/百年国耻). This phrase—explicitly linked to imperialism—was used extensively at the 1997 celebrations for Hong Kong's return.³⁵

Victimisation and Insecurity: Japan's Global External Identity under Threat

Japan's wish to achieve equal footing and a special interest in Asia meant that China played an integral role in her expansionist imperial ambitions. Manchuria, in particular, had remained at the forefront of Japanese minds, becoming almost totemic to Japanese identity in the early twentieth century. Subsequently, the conquest of Manchuria in 1931 was eagerly supported even by those critical of undisguised militarism at the time.³⁶ It was a unifying symbol in a period when division due to political and economic turmoil was prevalent (as it was in the West).

The importance of Manchuria as a national *symbol* to Japan—an integral element of any definition of 'national identity'—may appear an anathema to modern eyes. However, it had developed in the mind of the people—thanks in a large part to the press—as Japan's 'lifeline' (*seimeisen*/生命線).³⁷ It highlighted the defensive nature of Japanese imperialism which remains today in Japan's economic 'imperialism'.³⁸ The nationalism and attempted reassertion of traditional Japanese culture of the 1920s and 1930s was equally a defensive response to the Japan that failed to say 'no' to the influx of Western politics and culture.³⁹

Re-moulding the Middle Kingdom: Redefining Chinese National Identity

The threat posed by Imperial Japan to the national integrity of China provided the impetus and conditions for the creation of a modern national identity in China. Firstly, Japan provided the symbolism required for the successful creation of a national identity. Secondly, she also created the conditions in which a truly *national* identity could be formed.

Symbolically, the liberation of the Shandong peninsula from German imperialism in 1914 turned out to be a sideward step in that Japanese imperialism merely took over the lease—this was international *recognition* for Japan but *rejection* for China. Indeed, the influence of Japan's pariah-like position within *historic* Asian imperialism may have presented it as a backward step. Anti-Japanese sentiment was integral in creating some of the most iconic events of the formation of Chinese national identity. For example, the Day of National Humiliation (9 May) surrounding the agreement to most of the 'Twenty-One Demands' in 1915. These demands were intended to 'forestall republican nationalism in China to guarantee [Japan's] own position' but ended up 'advancing

27. Gino Piovesana and Naoshi Yamawaki, *Recent Japanese Philosophical Thought, 1862-1996: a survey* (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1997), p. 60

28. Guoqi Xu, *China and the Great War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 2.

29. John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 230.

30. Jonathan Adams, 'Science Heads East,' *New Scientist*, no. 2742, January 9, 2010, 24; R. Keith Schoppa, *Revolution and its Past* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2006), 6.

31. Schoppa, *Revolution and its Past*, 6. In the case of Japan, the Treaty of Portsmouth after the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) revealed the ill-treatment and thus lack of full recognition of Japan in the Western world. This lack of recognition was put even more saliently by the rejection of the racial clause in the League of Nations Charter suggested by Japan. The assumption that both were racially based is again suggestive of the importance of external and internal perceptions on the formation of national identity. Andrew Gordon, *A Modern History of Japan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 174.

32. Schoppa, *Revolution and its Past*, 105.

33. D.R. Howland, *Borders of Chinese Civilization: Geography and History at Empire's End* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996), 22. The Chinese term for Japan, *wō*, can be translated many ways. However, each has a derogatory connotation whether taken as being 'dwarf', 'submissive' or otherwise.

34. Schoppa, *Revolution and its Past*, 105.

35. Paul A. Cohen, *China Unbound: evolving perspectives on the Chinese past* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 182; Harrison, *China*, 265.

36. Sandra Wilson, *The Manchurian Crisis and Japanese Society, 1931-33* (London: Routledge, 2002), 45.

37. Wilson, *The Manchurian Crisis and Japanese Society*, 56

38. Michael Yahuda, *The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995* (London: Routledge, 1996), 235.

This can be seen by the distinctly negative and defensive response of the 1989 work by the Sony chairman, Shintaro Ishihara, entitled *The Japan That Can Say 'No': The New US-Japan Relations Card* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991).

39. Hiroshi, 'On Rationalization and the National Lifestyle,' 61.

that nationalism and focusing it against Japan.⁴⁰ Chinese nationalism had been advanced by providing the symbolism required for 'national identity.' It was Japanese national identity that was the cause of this policy in the first place with them trying to create an Asian imperialism that was equal to Western imperialism—its special mission as a paradoxically anti-imperialist Asian imperialism.⁴¹

Japanese imperialism also impacted upon Chinese national identity elsewhere. Two significant anti-imperialist demonstrations—the May Fourth Movement (1919) and May Thirtieth Movement (1925)—highlighted the continued isolation of the urban-Western from traditional-rural Chinese identities.⁴² However, the events of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) meant that 'hundreds of thousands of people fled before the Japanese.... Many of these refugees were members of the educated urban elite...and they were determined to arouse the Chinese people to resist Japan.'⁴³ The war of resistance against Japanese imperialism saw a 'change in the nature of both traditional rural and modern urban forms of national identity'.⁴⁴ Traditional 'Middle Kingdom' identity thus met with modern 'Western' identity. Traditional Confucian values, once deemed the antithesis of modern national identity were now the *basis* of modern national identity.⁴⁵ The Communist commentator, Ba Ren, adapted Confucianism's filial loyalty so that: 'Loyalty is defined not as an ethical obligation to an individual ruler, but rather to the nation. Filial piety is also not defined as an obligation to one's parents, but to the race as a whole'.⁴⁶ The threat of Japanese imperialism provided the opportunity to bring the split Chinese identity—created by Western imperialism—together and the injection of Confucianism created a distinctly Chinese character.

Conclusion

Imperialism was integral to the formation of Japanese and Chinese national identity. Western imperialism forced modernisation upon nations and, naturally, changed their identity. Attempts to adopt Western culture were attempts to *defend* their national identity (or at least their sovereignty over it). It was a form of mimicry; but mimicry is a compromise.⁴⁷ Some of their national identity was lost whilst some was retained. In other words, an organism that mimics another may appear superficially the same as the organism it is mimicking. However, underneath it remains very much the

original organism.⁴⁸

'War is the father of all things.'⁴⁹ These oft-cited words of Heraclitus reverberate strongly with the impact of imperialism on national identity. Imperialism brings about a series of 'wars': cultural, between the dominant imperialist culture and the colonised or semi-colonised; political and economic, attempts to wrest political and economic autonomy from imperial powers; and literally wars such as the two Sino-Japanese Wars. Similarly, imperialism created the need for a war of international recognition. *Mimicking* the identity of the dominant power of the day provided one means of achieving this whilst fighting to maintain their own distinctive national identity. In reality, the true question should be: 'How important was *anti-imperialism* in the formation of national identity?'

Furthermore, national identity is dynamic. It is constantly formed and reformed. Resultantly, imperialism remains an integral part of this dynamic process. When Chinese students protested against the economic 'second invasion' of Japan in 1985 they were utilising the common national identity created by Japanese imperialism (and the economic imperialism brought about by the West) during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.⁵⁰ However, it was also a manifestation of late twentieth-century Chinese national identity. Similarly, imperialism continues to form and reform Japanese identity. The Fukuda Doctrine (1977) can be seen as a reaction against Japan's *external* national identity formed by other countries in response to Japan's imperialist past. Fukuda's talk of a non-military role of Japan, 'heart-to-heart' relations and economic terms of equality with other Asian nations diametrically opposed the national identity originally founded under the aegis of new Asian imperialism.⁵¹ Nonetheless, the 'special mission' of the anti-imperialist imperialism continues to mark Japan's national identity as can be seen by the activities of the Society for the Creation of a New History formed in the 1990s. They opined that 'History textbooks in current use not only make absolutely no contribution to the formation of a national identity, but also serve to obstruct the formation of that identity.'⁵² Their proposed replacement textbook rendered Japan and its anti-imperialist imperialism the inspiration for Asia—Japanese national identity formed around a 'special role' is by no means dead.⁵³

As such, the importance of imperialism in the *formation* of Japanese and Chinese national identities was unequivocally important. Imperialism's role can be seen through the entire process of the emergence of a truly modern national identity. However, its true importance is revealed by the fact that

40. Shinkichi Etō, 'China's International Relations, 1911-1931' in *The Cambridge History of China: Republican China, 1912-1949*, vol. 13, part 2 ed. John K. Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 99

41. Goto-Jones, *Modern Japan*, 63.

42. The May Fourth Movement (1919) was originally planned for 7 May to coincide with the day that the ultimatum version of the 'Twenty-One Demands' were delivered to Yuan Shikai. Yuan Shikai was President of the Chinese Republic from 1912 to 1915 when he declared himself Emperor of the *Hongxian* (Great Constitutional) era. He reigned for only 88 days. Peter Zarrow, *After Empire: the conceptual transformation of the Chinese State, 1885-1924* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 243; Harrison, *China*, 170.

43. Harrison, *China*, 219.

44. Harrison, *China*, 219.

45. Chen Duxiu, 'Kongzi zhi dao yu xiandai shenghuo' [The Way of Confucius and Modern Life], *Xin qingnian* [New Youth] 2/4 (1916); William Theodore De Bary, *Sources of East Asian Tradition* (Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press, 2008), 704

46. Ba Ren (a well-known Communist critic) cited in Poshek Fu, *Passivity, Resistance and Collaboration: intellectual choices in occupied Shanghai, 1937-1945* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 83. The citation continues: 'So if anyone ever runs counter to the benefit of the nation-race... we have to oppose and to eliminate [zhicai] him in the very name of loyalty and filial piety. This is the ethical grounding of collectivism.'

47. Homi K. Babha, *Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 2004), 86.

48. Hence although Chinese intellectuals and society adopted Western concepts they maintained Chinese characteristics. For example, Sun Yat-sen's 'Three Principles of the People' adopted a Constitution but it had both Western and distinctly Chinese characteristics [Scott Morton, *et al*, *China*, 178-9]. Similarly, in Japan the attempts to make a Civil Code (a Western idea) apply to Japan took over twenty years to come to fruition because the previous drafts did not take into account Japanese customs. Indeed, imperialism provided the ways to understand their national culture by offering a threat to their culture and an otherness by which to define their culture [Shively, 'The Japanization of the Middle Meiji', 90].

49. Cited in Edward Tick, *War and the Soul* (Wheaton, IL.: Quest, 2005), 31.

50. Yahuda, *The International Politics of Asia-Pacific*, 245.

51. Alan Rix, *Japan's Economic Aid: policy-making and politics* (London: Croom Helm, 1980), 232; Yahuda, *The International Politics of Asia-Pacific*, 243.

52. Nathan, *Japan Unbound*, 139.

53. Nathan, *Japan Unbound*, 141.

it continues to influence Japanese and Chinese national identities long after imperialism's physical presence has disappeared and we enter what many consider the 'Asian Century'.

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